Do Stronger Patents Stimulate or Stifle Innovation? The Crucial Role of Financial Development by Chu, Angus C. et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Do Stronger Patents Stimulate or Stifle
Innovation? The Crucial Role of
Financial Development
Angus C. Chu and Guido Cozzi and Haichao Fan and
Shiyuan Pan and Mengbo Zhang
Fudan University, University of St. Gallen, Fudan University,
Zhejiang University, University of California, Los Angeles
September 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/92488/
MPRA Paper No. 92488, posted 2 March 2019 05:47 UTC
Do Stronger Patents Stimulate or Stie Innovation?
The Crucial Role of Financial Development
Angus C. Chu, Guido Cozzi, Haichao Fan, Shiyuan Pan, Mengbo Zhang
February 15, 2019
Abstract
This study explores the e¤ects of patent protection in an R&D-based growth model
with nancial frictions. We nd that whether stronger patent protection stimulates or
sties innovation depends on credit constraints faced by R&D entrepreneurs. When
credit constraints are non-binding (binding), strengthening patent protection stimu-
lates (sties) R&D. The overall e¤ect of patent protection on innovation follows an
inverted-U pattern. By relaxing the credit constraints, nancial development stimu-
lates innovation. Furthermore, patent protection is more likely to have a positive e¤ect
on innovation under a higher level of nancial development. We consider cross-country
panel regressions and nd supportive evidence for this result.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In this study, we explore the e¤ects of patent protection in an R&D-based growth model.
Our growth-theoretic analysis of patent policy features nancial frictions in the form of
potentially binding credit constraints on R&D entrepreneurs. As in Aghion, Howitt and
Mayer-Foulkes (2005), due to moral hazard, R&D entrepreneurs may not be able to borrow
as much as they want for their R&D investment. When these credit constraints are non-
binding, we nd that strengthening patent protection by increasing patent breadth leads to
a larger amount of monopolistic prot, which stimulates R&D and technological progress.
This positive monopolistic-prot e¤ect captures the traditional view of patent protection.
However, when the credit constraints are binding, we nd that the monopolistic distortion
arising from patent protection leads to more severe nancial frictions, which stie R&D and
slow down technological progress. We refer to this e¤ect as a negative nancial distortionary
e¤ect of patent protection.
The intuition of this nancial distortionary e¤ect can be explained as follows. As in the
seminal study by Nordhaus (1969), patent protection causes monopolistic distortion, which
in turn reduces aggregate income in general equilibrium and tightens credit constraints faced
by R&D entrepreneurs in the presence of nancial frictions. Our mechanics relies on credit
constraints to make R&D a constant fraction of aggregate income. Then, the monopolistic
distortion of patent protection on aggregate income reduces R&D and economic growth when
credit constraints are binding. Hence we nd that credit constraints jeopardize the classical
Schumpeterian trade-o¤ between static and dynamic e¢ ciency: less static e¢ ciency (i.e.,
lower output) by causing less R&D entails less dynamic e¢ ciency (i.e., lower growth). In
this case, stronger patent protection reduces the rates of innovation and economic growth,
in addition to reducing the level of output.
This nding is consistent with recent studies that often nd the presence of nega-
tive e¤ects of patent protection on innovation.1 Furthermore, we nd that the positive
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monopolistic-prot e¤ect of patent protection prevails when the level of patent protection
is below a threshold value, whereas the negative nancial distortionary e¤ect of patent pro-
tection prevails when the level of patent protection is above the threshold. Therefore, the
overall e¤ect of patent protection on R&D and innovation follows an inverted-U pattern that
is commonly found in empirical studies.2
We consider the case in which a higher level of nancial development relaxes credit
constraints by making it more di¢ cult for borrowers to defraud. As in Aghion, Howitt
and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), we nd that a higher level of nancial development stimulates
innovation. Intuitively, when R&D entrepreneurs are less likely to defraud, banks are more
willing to lend to them for R&D investment. Furthermore, we have a novel nding that
patent protection is more likely to have a positive e¤ect on innovation under a higher level of
nancial development. The intuition of this result can be explained as follows. When banks
become more willing to lend to R&D entrepreneurs, the credit constraints are less likely to
be binding, in which case patent protection has a positive e¤ect on innovation.
We test this theoretical implication using cross-country panel regression. We nd that
patent protection and nancial development have a positive interaction e¤ect on innovation.
Ang (2010, 2011) also empirically explores the e¤ects of patent protection and nancial
development on R&D activities. We complement the analysis in Ang by considering the
interaction e¤ect of patent protection and nancial development on economic growth. Their
positive interaction e¤ect on innovation is consistent with our theoretical nding that patent
protection is more likely to have a positive e¤ect on innovation under a higher level of nancial
development. Therefore, to capture the complete e¤ects of patent policy on economic growth,
it is useful to explore how the e¤ect of patent protection changes under di¤erent levels of
nancial development.
This study relates to the literature on patent policy. In this literature, Nordhaus (1969)
provides the seminal study in which he shows that increasing patent length causes a positive
e¤ect on innovation and a negative static distortionary e¤ect on welfare. While Nordhaus fo-
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cuses on a partial-equilibrium framework, we consider a dynamic general-equilibrium (DGE)
model in which the monopolistic distortion caused by patent protection interacts with -
nancial frictions to a¤ect credit constraints and stie innovation. Subsequent studies in
this literature, such as Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer (1990), explore patent
breadth in addition to patent length. Scotchmer (2004) provides a comprehensive review
of this patent-design literature. Our study instead explores the e¤ects of patent policy in
a DGE model in which the nancial distortionary e¤ect of patent policy arises through a
general-equilibrium channel. Therefore, this study relates more closely to the macroeconomic
literature on patent policy and economic growth based on DGE models.
The seminal DGE analysis of patent policy is Judd (1985), who nds that an innite
patent length maximizes innovation and eliminates the relative-price distortion because all
industries charge the same markup. Our model features an innite patent length under which
the relative-price distortion is absent as in Judd.3 However, we show that patent breadth
interacts with a nancial distortion that a¤ects credit constraints and R&D. Subsequent
studies in this literature explore patent breadth as an alternative patent-policy instrument;
see for example, Li (2001), Goh and Olivier (2002) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013).4 Some
of these studies also nd that strengthening patent protection has an inverted-U e¤ect on
innovation and growth. Our study di¤ers from these previous studies by exploring the e¤ects
of patent protection in the presence of nancial frictions. In other words, we analyze the
interaction between patent protection and credit constraints, which is the novel contribution
of this study.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents stylized facts. Section
3 describes the R&D-based growth model. Section 4 presents theoretical results. The nal
section concludes.
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2 STYLIZED FACTS
In this section, we document the empirical relationship between patent protection, nancial
development and economic growth. Specically, we use cross-country panel data, which
consist of 48 countries from 1998 to 2014. We consider the following empirical specication:
Growthi;t+1 = 0 + 1IPRi;t + 2IPRi;t  FDi;t +  i;t + i + t + "i;t, (1)
where Growthi;t+1 is the growth rate of GDP or per capita GDP in country i, IPRi;t is an
index of patent protection, and FDi;t is the level of nancial development. i;t denotes a
vector of the following control variables: FDi;t, the degree of openness, the unemployment
rate and the quality of institutions.5 Specically, the degree of openness is dened as the sum
of exports and imports as a share of GDP, whereas the quality of institutions is measured by
investment risks from the International Country Risk Guide.6 i is the country xed e¤ects.
t is the year xed e¤ects.
We use the index of patent strength constructed by Papageorgiadis, Cross and Alexiou
(2014) to measure the level of patent protection.7 This patent index has the following ad-
vantages. First, observations are available at annual frequency.8 Second, the index captures
patent enforcement in addition to the strength of statutory protection.9
For the measurement of nancial development, we follow King and Levine (1993), Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2010) and Manova (2013) to use the ratio of private credit by
deposit money banks and other nancial institutions to GDP, denoted by private credit, as
a proxy for the overall development of a countrys nancial system.10 As stated in Levine,
Loayza and Beck (2000), private credit excludes credit granted to the public sector and credit
granted by the central bank and development banks, and hence, it better captures the overall
level of nancial development. In addition, we also use the ratio of deposit money banks
assets to GDP, denoted by bank assets, as a robustness check. Data for these two variables
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can be obtained from the Global Financial Development Database.11
Di¤erentiating the rate of economic growth with respect to IPR yields
@Growthi;t+1
@IPRi;t
= 1 + 2FDi;t. (2)
Our theoretical model in the subsequent sections predicts that 1 < 0 and 2 > 0. In other
words, for a country that has a low level of nancial development (i.e., a small FDi;t), the
e¤ect of IPR on economic growth is negative. For a country that has a high level of nancial
development (i.e., a large FDi;t), the e¤ect of IPR on economic growth becomes positive.
Table 1 reports our benchmark results. In the rst two columns, nancial development
is measured by private credit, whereas in the last two columns, it is measured by bank
assets. In some columns, Growthi;t+1 is measured by the growth rate of GDP. In other
columns, Growthi;t+1 is measured by the growth rate of GDP per capita. As shown in the
Table 1, all the coe¢ cients of the interaction term between patent protection and nancial
development are positive and signicant, whereas the coe¢ cients of patent protection are
all negative and signicant.12 We also run a t-test on patent protection and its interaction
with nancial development, which shows that the e¤ect of patent protection on economic
growth is negative and signicant for countries with the lowest level of nancial development
(positive and signicant for countries with the highest level of nancial development). To
verify the validity of our results, we also drop the highest and lowest one-percent outliers of
IPR from our sample. As shown in Table 2, the results are similar.
[Insert Table 1 and Table 2 here]
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3 ANR&D-BASEDGROWTHMODELWITHCREDIT
FRICTIONS
The R&D-based growth model originates from the seminal work by Romer (1990). In this
section, we consider a discrete-time version and follow Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes
(2005) to incorporate nancial frictions into the Romer model.
3.1 Households and Workers/Entrepreneurs
There is a unit continuum of innitely-lived households. These households own intangible
capital (in the form of patents that generate monopolistic prots) and consume nal good
(numeraire). The lifetime utility function of a household is given by
U =
1P
t=0
Ct
(1 + )t
, (3)
where the parameter  > 0 is the subjective discount rate and Ct is consumption of the
household at time t. The asset-accumulation equation is At+1 = (1 + rt)At   Ct. From
standard dynamic optimization, the linear utility function implies that in equilibrium the
real interest rate is equal to the discount rate, such that rt =  for all t.
In addition to the innitely-lived households in the economy, we follow previous studies
to assume the presence of overlapping generations of workers/entrepreneurs in each period
to create a need for the entrepreneurs to borrow funding for R&D. At the beginning of
each period t, L workers enter the economy, and they work to earn wage Wt. At the end
of the period, each worker becomes an entrepreneur and devotes part of her wage income
Wt to R&D, where  2 (0; 1].13 At the beginning of the next period, those entrepreneurs
who have succeeded in their R&D projects sell their inventions to households and use the
proceeds for consumption. Without loss of generality, we normalize L to unity. A worker
who enters the economy in period t has the utility function ut = yt +Et[ot+1]=(1 + ), where
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yt denotes consumption when young and Et[ot+1] denotes expected consumption when old.
If the amount of her R&D spending Zt is less than Wt, then a worker/entrepreneur simply
consumes Wt   Zt in period t or saves part of it subject to the market interest rate rt.
However, if Zt > Wt, then the worker/entrepreneur would need to apply for a loan subject
to credit constraints, which will be described in details in Section 3.7.
3.2 Final Good
The nal-good sector is perfectly competitive. Firms in this sector employ workers and use a
mass of di¤erentiated intermediate goods v 2 [0; Nt] to produce nal good using the following
production function:
Yt = (Lt)
1 
Z Nt
0
[xt (v)]
dv, (4)
where the parameter  2 (0; 1) determines labor intensity 1    in production. Lt is labor
input. xt (v) is the amount of intermediate good v 2 [0; Nt], and Nt is the number of
available intermediate goods at time t. Competitive rms take the prices of nal good and
factor inputs as given to maximize prot. The conditional labor demand function is given by
Wt = (1  )Yt=Lt, where Lt = L = 1 from the market-clearing condition. The conditional
demand function for intermediate good v is given by
xt (v) =


pt (v)
1=(1 )
, (5)
where pt (v) is the price of intermediate good v.
3.3 Intermediate Goods
Each di¤erentiated intermediate good v is produced by a rm that owns the patent of the
product and has market power, which is determined by the level of patent protection to be
explained below. In industry v, the rm produces xt (v) units of intermediate goods using
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xt (v) units of nal good as inputs. Therefore, the prot function of the rm in industry v is
t (v) = pt (v)xt (v)  xt (v) = [pt (v)  1]


pt (v)
1=(1 )
, (6)
where the second equality follows from (5).
Using (6), one can derive the prot-maximizing price pt (v) given by 1=. To capture
the e¤ects of patent protection, we follow Goh and Olivier (2002) to model patent breadth
 2 (1; 1=) as a policy parameter. The idea is that the unit cost for imitative rms to
produce xt (v) is , which is assumed to be increasing in the level of patent protection.
Therefore, a larger patent breadth  allows the monopolistic producer of xt (v), who owns
the patent, to charge a higher markup without losing her market share.14 In this case,
pt (v) = . (7)
Combining (6) and (7), we obtain the amount of prot as a function of patent breadth given
by
t (v) = (   1)



1=(1 )
 (), (8)
which is increasing in patent breadth  for  < 1=.
3.4 Aggregate Production Function
Substituting (5) and (7) into (4) yields
Yt =



=(1 )
Nt. (9)
Equation (9) shows that the growth rate of Yt is determined by the growth rate of Nt.
Furthermore, for a given Nt, the level of Yt is decreasing in patent breadth , which captures
the e¤ect of markup distortion on the level of output.15 In other words, by increasing the price
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of intermediate goods, a larger markup leads to less intermediate goods being produced and
also less nal good being produced.16 In the presence of credit constraints, patent protection
would then generate a negative e¤ect on R&D as a result of this markup distortion as we
will show later.
3.5 R&D and the Value of Patents
There is an R&D sector. In each period t, workers/entrepreneurs devote nal good to R&D
at the end of the period to invent new intermediate goods that will be produced in the
next period. To ensure balanced growth, we assume that each entrepreneur spreads her
R&D spending Zt over Nt R&D projects.17 Therefore, the amount of nal good that an
entrepreneur devotes to each of her R&D projects is Zt=Nt, and the probability of her R&D
projects being successful is Pt = minfZt=(Ntt); 1g,18 where 1=t captures the productivity
in R&D. We adopt the following specication for t:
t = 

Zt
Nt

, (10)
where  > 0 and  2 (0; 1). The term (Zt=Nt) captures an intratemporal duplication
externality of R&D as in Jones and Williams (2000). Given the unit continuum of R&D
entrepreneurs and the independence of R&D projects (across entrepreneurs), the law of
large numbers applies, so that the accumulation of inventions at the aggregate level follows
a deterministic process given by
Nt  Nt+1  Nt = Zt
t
=
Nt


Zt
Nt
1 
, (11)
where Zt=t = NtZt=(Ntt) is the number of successful R&D projects in period t.
Each R&D project has a probability Pt to give rise to a new variety of intermediate
goods. When a new variety is successfully invented at the end of period t, production of the
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intermediate goods begins in period t + 1. We denote the value of an invention created in
period t as Vt (v). The discount rate for future prots is given by rt =  for all t. Vt (v) can
be expressed as
Vt (v) =
1P
s=t
s+1 (v)
(1 + r)s+1 t
=
 ()

, (12)
which is increasing in patent breadth . The positive e¤ect of  captures the positive e¤ect
of patent protection on the value of inventions.
3.6 Equilibrium Without Credit Constraints
In this section, we explore the equilibrium level of R&D in the absence of credit constraints.
The zero-expected-prot condition of R&D is given by PtVt = Zt=Nt, which can be expressed
as
Vt = t ,
()

= 

Zt
Nt

. (13)
Therefore, the level of R&D at time t is given by
Zt =

()

1=
Nt, (14)
which is increasing in . The growth rate of technology in the absence of credit constraints
is given by
Nt
Nt
=
1


Zt
Nt
1 
=
1
1=

()

(1 )=
 g1. (15)
The growth rate g1 in (15) is increasing in patent breadth  capturing the positive monopo-
listic prot e¤ect of patent protection on innovation. Proposition 1 summarizes this result,
which is often found in the literature; see for example Judd (1985), Li (2001), ODonoghue
and Zweimüller (2004) and Horii and Iwaisako (2007).
PROPOSITION 1 In the absence of credit constraints, stronger patent protection leads to
a higher growth rate of technology.
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Proof. Use (8) and (15) to show that g1 is increasing in .
3.7 Equilibrium With Credit Constraints
Before the end of a period, each entrepreneur devotes her wage income Wt to Nt R&D
projects without borrowing. If the R&D spending Zt exceeds her wage income Wt, then
she would have to borrow Dt = Zt   Wt from a bank to nance her R&D projects. If her
R&D projects succeed, she repays the loan plus an interest payment equal to (1+Rt+1)Dt at
the end of the period. If her R&D projects fail, she becomes bankrupt and repays nothing to
the bank. Therefore, if the entrepreneur truthfully reveals the outcome of her R&D projects,
the expected payment received by the bank is Pt(1+Rt+1)Dt+(1 Pt)0. When banks make
zero expected prot, we have Pt(1 + Rt+1)Dt = Dt, which implies Pt(1 + Rt+1) = 1. In
other words, a higher probability Pt of R&D success reduces the interest rate Rt+1 charged
by competitive banks.
What makes it di¢ cult to borrow is that an entrepreneur may want to default even when
her projects are successful. As in Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), banks do not
observe the outcome of R&D projects, and hence, the problem of moral hazard arises.19
Specically, by paying a hiding cost hZt where h 2 (0; 1), an entrepreneur can hide the
outcome of her projects and avoid repaying the loan. The cost parameter h is an indicator of
bankse¤ectiveness in securing repayment and measures the level of nancial development.
We follow Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes to assume that in case an entrepreneur decides
to defraud, the entrepreneur must incur the hiding cost before observing the outcome of her
R&D projects. Therefore, entrepreneurs would not defraud if and only if the following
incentive-compatibility (IC) constraint holds:
hZt  Pt(1 +Rt+1)Dt = Dt, (16)
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where Dt = Zt   Wt = Zt   (1  )Yt. Substituting this condition into (16) yields
Zt  (1  )Yt
1  h =
(1  )
1  h



=(1 )
Nt, (17)
where the last equality uses (9). We refer to this IC constraint as a credit constraint, which
becomes tighter as patent breadth  increases capturing an interaction between the monop-
olistic distortion of patent protection and the nancial distortion of the credit constraint.
The intuition can be explained as follows. When patent breadth  increases, aggregate in-
come Y decreases due to the markup distortion. As a result, a larger  reduces the income
of entrepreneurs and their ability to borrow for R&D. This interaction e¤ect exists so long
as entrepreneursability to borrow is a¤ected by their income and in turn entrepreneurs
income is related to aggregate income.
For convenience, we dene f  (1 )=(1  h) 2 (0;1) as a composite parameter that
is increasing in the hiding cost h. Then, substituting (17) into (11) yields the growth rate
of technology, in the presence of a binding credit constraint, as follows:
Nt
Nt
=
1

"


=(1 )
f
#1 
 g2. (18)
The equilibrium growth rate g2 in (18) is decreasing in the level of patent breadth  cap-
turing the abovementioned nancial distortionary e¤ect of patent protection on innovation.
Furthermore, a higher level of nancial development f reected by a larger hiding cost in-
creases the growth rate of technology as in Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005).20 We
summarize these results in Proposition 2.
PROPOSITION 2 In the presence of binding credit constraints, stronger patent protection
leads to a lower growth rate of technology. A higher level of nancial development leads to a
higher growth rate of technology.
Proof. Use (18) to show that g2 is decreasing in  and increasing in f .
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In the previous section, we nd that when the credit constraint is not binding, our model
features the classic trade-o¤ of patent protection that yields a static loss in output and a
dynamic gain in growth. In this section, we show that when the credit constraint becomes
binding, this trade-o¤ disappears. Specically, the dynamic gain becomes a dynamic loss in
growth whereas the static loss in output is still present.
Equations (14) and (17) show that the equilibrium level of R&D spending Zt satises
Zt = min
(
()

1=
;



=(1 )
f
)
Nt. (19)
There exists a unique value of patent breadth  below (above) which the credit constraint
does not bind (is binding) in the long run. Equating [()=()]1= and (=)=(1 )f yields
this threshold value , which is determined by
(   1)



(1 )=(1 )
= f , (20)
where the left-hand side of (20) is increasing in . Therefore, the threshold value  is
increasing in f . The intuition of this result can be explained as follows. A larger hiding cost
reduces entrepreneursincentives to defraud and enables them to borrow more funding for
R&D. In this case, the credit constraint is less likely to be binding, which in turn increases
the threshold value of patent breadth.
4 PATENTBREADTHANDCREDIT CONSTRAINTS
Based on the results in the previous section, we can consider two scenarios. First, the level of
patent breadth satises  < , where the threshold  is derived in (20). Second, the level
of patent breadth satises  > . According to this classication, the equilibrium growth
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rate is given by
g =
8>><>>:
g1(
+
); if  < (f
+
)
g2(
 
; f
+
); if  > (f
+
)
. (21)
We summarize these results in Proposition 3.
PROPOSITION 3 When the level of patent protection is below , the equilibrium growth
rate is increasing in patent breadth. When the level of patent protection is above , the
equilibrium growth rate is decreasing in patent breadth and increasing in the hiding cost.
The overall e¤ect of patent breadth on the equilibrium growth rate follows an inverted-U
pattern, and the growth-maximizing level of patent breath is increasing in the level of nancial
development.
Proof. Use (21) to show that (a) g2 is increasing in f and (b) g is initially increasing in 
and then becomes decreasing in  after passing the threshold . Then, use (20) to show
that  is increasing in f .
When the level of patent protection is below , entrepreneurs are not nancially con-
strained. In this case, stronger patent protection increases the amount of monopolistic prot,
which in turn stimulates R&D and increases the equilibrium growth rate. When the level
of patent protection is above , entrepreneurs become nancially constrained. In this case,
stronger patent protection amplies monopolistic distortion and reduces the level of output,
which in turn tightens the credit constraint on R&D and decreases the equilibrium growth
rate. A higher level of nancial development increases the hiding cost, which in turn enables
the entrepreneurs to borrow more funding for R&D and increases the equilibrium growth
rate.
For a given hiding cost, an increase in the level of patent protection may cause the
nancial constraint to change from non-binding to binding; therefore, there exists a growth-
maximizing level of patent protection . This growth-maximizing level of patent protection
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 is determined by the level of nancial development f . Specically,  is increasing in f .
Therefore, as a country becomes more nancially developed, it should implement a stronger
patent system to stimulate innovation. Intuitively, as mentioned before, a larger hiding cost
reduces entrepreneursincentives to defraud, which enables them to borrow more funding for
R&D. In this case, the credit constraint is less likely to be binding, which in turn increases
the threshold value  of patent breadth and renders patent protection more likely to have a
positive e¤ect on R&D. We summarize this result in Proposition 4, which is consistent with
the stylized facts in Section 2.
PROPOSITION 4 Patent protection is more likely to have a positive e¤ect on innovation
under a higher level of nancial development.
Proof. Because  is increasing in f as shown in (20), a larger f expands the range of  in
which g is increasing in .
4.1 Extensions
In this section, we consider an alternative assumption under which R&D entrepreneurs
ability to borrow depends on prot income in addition to wage income. For simplicity,
we assume  = 1; in other words, the entrepreneurs can devote to R&D projects the entire
amount of wage incomeWt and prot income ()Nt.21 In this case, the amount of borrowing
becomes
Dt = Zt   [Wt + ()Nt] = Zt   [(1  )Yt + ()Nt] . (22)
As a result, the IC constraint hZt  Dt can be expressed as
Zt  1
1  h [(1  )Yt + ()Nt] =
1
1  h
"
(1  )



=(1 )
+ ()
#
Nt. (23)
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Substituting (23) into (11) yields the growth rate of technology under a binding credit
constraint as follows:
Nt
Nt
=
1


1
1  h
()
1 
, (24)
where 
()  (1   ) (=)=(1 ) + () = (=  1) (=)1=(1 ) > 0. Di¤erentiating

() with respect to  yields
@
()
@
= 
()

1
     
1
   

< 0. (25)
Therefore, under a binding credit constraint, the equilibrium growth rate is decreasing in
patent breadth even when the entrepreneurs can also devote prot income into R&D. Intu-
itively, the negative e¤ect of patent protection on wage income dominates its positive e¤ect
on prot income in our model.
However, if entrepreneurs can use the value of existing patents, instead of just current
prot income, as means of internal nance, then the positive e¤ect of patent protection on
the value of patents may relax the credit constraint. To explore this scenario, we consider
another assumption under which R&D entrepreneursability to borrow depends on the value
of patents in addition to wage income. In this case, the amount of borrowing becomes
Dt = Zt   [Wt + VtNt] = Zt  

(1  )Yt + ()Nt


. (26)
As a result, the IC constraint hZt  Dt can be expressed as
Zt  1
1  h

(1  )Yt + ()Nt


=
1
1  h
"
(1  )



=(1 )
+
()

#
Nt. (27)
Substituting (27) into (11) yields the growth rate of technology under a binding credit
constraint as follows:
Nt
Nt
=
1


1
1  h	()
1 
, (28)
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where
	() 

1  

 +
   1




1=(1 )
> 0. (29)
Di¤erentiating 	() with respect to  yields
@	()
@
= 	()

(1  )= + 1=
(1  )= + (   1)=  
1
   

, (30)
which is negative if and only if
 >
1  
    2 (0; 1). (31)
Even if we consider a conservatively low annual discount rate of 3.5% and 20 years for one
generation, then the discount rate  would be equal to (1 + 0:035)20   1 = 0:99, which in
turn implies that the above inequality is likely to hold. Therefore, this section conrms the
robustness of our theoretical results.
5 CONCLUSION
In this study, we have explored the e¤ects of patent protection and nancial development
on economic growth. We nd that whether strengthening patent protection has a positive
or negative e¤ect on technological progress depends on credit constraints. When credit con-
straints are not binding, strengthening patent protection has a positive e¤ect on economic
growth. When credit constraints are binding, strengthening patent protection has a negative
e¤ect on growth. An increase in the level of patent protection may cause the credit con-
straints to become binding. As a result, the overall e¤ect of patent protection on economic
growth follows an inverted-U pattern. A higher level of nancial development relaxes credit
constraints by increasing the hiding cost. As a result, a higher level of nancial develop-
ment stimulates innovation. Furthermore, patent protection is more likely to have a positive
e¤ect on innovation under a higher level of nancial development. Our regression results
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show that strengthening patent protection is indeed more likely to have a positive e¤ect on
innovation under a higher level of nancial development. Therefore, this study shows the
importance of an often neglected interaction between the monopolistic distortion caused by
patent protection and the nancial distortion caused by credit constraints.
APPENDIX: DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA SET
The empirical analysis is based on a panel dataset for 48 countries from 1998 to 2014.
Variables used in the regressions are listed below with denitions and data sources. Table
A1 reports the summary statistics of these variables.
 Growthi;t+1: the rate of economic growth. There are two measures: 1) annual growth
rate of GDP per capita; and 2) annual growth rate of GDP. Source: World Bank
Database.
 IPRi;t: an index of patent protection. Source: Papageorgiadis, Cross and Alexiou
(2014).
 FDi;t: the level of nancial development. There are two measures: 1) private credit
by deposit money banks and other nancial institutions as a share of GDP (private
credit); and 2) deposit money banksassets as a share of GDP (bank assets). Source:
µCihák et al. (2012).
 Unempi;t: the unemployment rate. Source: World Bank Database.
 Openi;t: the degree of openness, dened as the sum of exports and imports of goods
and services as a share of GDP. Source: World Bank Database.
 Insq i;t: the quality of institutions. Source: International Country Risk Guide.
[Insert Table A1 here]
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Footnotes
1See for example Ja¤e and Lerner (2004), Bessen and Meurer (2008) and Boldrin and Levine (2008).
2See for example Qian (2007) and Lerner (2009).
3Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) also show that the optimal patent length is innite and argue that "the
policy margin of patent length is not a useful one on which to operate."
4For other patent-policy instruments, see ODonoghue and Zweimüller (2004) and Kiedaisch (2015) on
patentability requirement, Furukawa (2007), Horii and Iwaisako (2007) and Chu, Cozzi and Galli (2014)
on protection against imitation, Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007) and Davis and S¸ener (2012) on rent
protection activities, and Chu (2009), Chu, Cozzi and Galli (2012), Chu and Pan (2013) and Cozzi and Galli
(2014) on blocking patents. None of these studies consider nancial frictions.
5See Appendix for a detailed description and sources of the data.
6See Fan and Gao (2017) who also use this index to measure the quality of institutions.
7Data available at: https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/management/research/projects/patent-systems/
8Another inuential patent index in the literature is the Ginarte-Park index in Ginarte and Park (1997)
and Park (2008). However, this index is only available quinquennially.
9See Papageorgiadis, Cross and Alexiou for a detailed discussion.
10If we use the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP instead, the results are similar.
11Data available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/gfdr/data/nancial-structure-database
12To mitigate the problem of endogeneity, we have also used the lagged values of IPR and FD as their
instrumental variables and nd that our results (available upon request) still hold.
13Here we assume that the entrepreneur may not be able to devote her entire wage income to R&D. Our
results also hold when  = 1.
14See also Li (2001) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013) for a similar formulation. This formulation captures
Gilbert and Shapiros (1990) insight on breadth as the ability of the patentee to raise priceand originates
from the patent-design literature; see for example Gallini (1992) who considers the case in which a larger
patent breadth increases the imitation cost of imitators.
15Here we assume that a change in patent policy applies to all patents. If the policy change applies to
only new patents, then its distortionary e¤ects would gradually arise, rather than occurring immediately.
Furthermore, there will be an additional relative-price distortion because old and new patented goods have
di¤erent markups.
16This distortionary e¤ect would be absent if xt (v) were produced from a xed factor input instead of the
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nal good. However, if we follow Romer (1990) to assume that intermediate goods are produced from capital,
then the markup distortion would still exist because the presence of markup and prots lowers capital income
and reduces capital accumulation. For example, Chu (2010) uses US data to calibrate a generalized version
of the Romer model to quantify the distortionary e¤ect of the patent system and nds that increasing the
patent length could lead to a non-negligible decrease in capital investment.
17To ensure the innovation probability Pt  1 in the presence of growth in Zt, we only need to assume
that entrepreneurs spread their R&D spending Zt over &Nt R&D projects, where & > 0. Without loss of
generality, we set & = 1.
18For simplicity, we assume that an entrepreneurs R&D projects either all succeed or all fail.
19As in Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, we do not consider the case in which patents can be used as
collateral. To be more precise, we assume that future patents cannot be used as collateral because R&D
projects have not been completed as the stage of borrowing. See Amable, Chatelain and Ralf (2010) for an
interesting analysis on patents as collateral.
20If nancial friction is modeled as screening of R&D projects as in Aghion and Howitt (2009, Ch. 6)
instead of credit constraints, then nancial development would still stimulate innovation. However, patent
breadth would no longer have a negative e¤ect on innovation due to the absence of credit constraints.
In reality, nancial development should a¤ect the screening of R&D projects and the tightness of credit
constraints. So long as credit constraints are present, the negative e¤ect of patent breadth on innovation
would exist whenever they are binding.
21This is also equal to the interest income rtAt = VtNt = ()Nt.
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Table 1: E¤ects of patent protection on economic growth
private credit bank assets
GDP GDP per capita GDP GDP per capita
IPR  FD 0.931*** 0.886*** 0.708*** 0.676***
(0.268) (0.254) (0.272) (0.261)
IPR -0.878** -0.863** -0.937** -0.927**
(0.362) (0.363) (0.399) (0.399)
other controls yes yes yes yes
country xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes
year xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes
observations 776 776 776 776
R-squared 0.569 0.540 0.559 0.529
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. IPR denotes the index of patent protection. FD denotes the
level of nancial development. Other control variables include FD, the degree of openness, the unemployment
rate and the quality of institutions. In the rst two columns, nancial development is measured by private
credit, whereas in the last two columns it is measured by bank assets. The dependent variable is economic
growth measured by either the growth rate of GDP or the growth rate of GDP per capita. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses.
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Table 2: E¤ects of patent protection (removing outliers)
private credit bank assets
GDP GDP per capita GDP GDP per capita
IPR  FD 0.930*** 0.878*** 0.708** 0.673**
(0.311) (0.290) (0.311) (0.295)
IPR -0.950** -0.920** -1.004** -0.983**
(0.381) (0.381) (0.423) (0.422)
other controls yes yes yes yes
country xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes
year xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes
observations 762 762 762 762
R-squared 0.572 0.541 0.561 0.530
Note: In this table, we drop the highest and lowest one-percent outliers of IPR. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01. IPR denotes the index of patent protection. FD denotes the level of nancial development. Other
control variables include FD, the degree of openness, the unemployment rate and the quality of institutions.
In the rst two columns, nancial development is measured by private credit, whereas in the last two columns
it is measured by bank assets. The dependent variable is economic growth measured by either the growth
rate of GDP or the growth rate of GDP per capita. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table A1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max
Growthi;t+1 (GDP) 776 3.030 3.610 -14.80 25.56
Growthi;t+1 (GDP per capita) 776 2.170 3.510 -14.42 24.38
IPRi;t 776 6.300 2.090 2.270 9.900
FDi;t (private credit) 776 0.870 0.500 0.080 2.620
FDi;t (bank assets) 776 0.930 0.480 0.110 2.630
Openi;t 776 0.900 0.710 0.160 4.430
Unempi;t 776 7.920 4.710 0.580 27.47
Insqi;t 776 5.800 2.150 1.670 10.00
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